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Earlier (collaborative) work postulated that agency is essentially indeterministic, and ﬁnds
a home in “branching times” (BT). BT is built on world-wide but momentary events called
“moments” structured by an indeterministic causal ordering. The notion of a “history” is
deﬁned as a suitable chain of moments; histories branch one from another at moments.
Other earlier work, the essential points of which are summarized in Section 2, led to
“branching space–times” (BST). BT moments are replaced in BST by local “point events,”
and “histories” are redeﬁned more realistically as a family of suitable space–time-like
structures that branch from one another at point events. In BST one ﬁnds that “transitions”
from initial events to outcome events—each properly deﬁned—play a fundamental role
as originating causes (causae causantes) and effects. This spatio-temporal-causal story
provides, in Section 3, an objective foundation for an indeterministic theory of agents and
choices amid BST (BSTAC), the key concepts of which are “life event,” “life history,” and
“person,” the latter essentially involving alternate possibilities, some of which arise from
free choices. Section 4 works out a concept of “choice point,” leading to a BST account of
“agent α sees to outcome O,” which is more sophisticated than the stit concept of earlier
work. Many-agent cooperation is considered in Section 5, with hints concerning message
sending and receiving. A theory of norms in BST (BSTACN) that builds on the foregoing,
and also on earlier work, is brieﬂy adumbrated in Section 6.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Norms and agency
The idea of norms presupposes agency, and agency presupposes an indeterministic causal order. This has been, of course,
a far from universal opinion since philosophers such as Kant and Hume, each in his own way a strict deterministic, popu-
lated the world with so-called “compatibilists,” meaning those who believe that agency is compatible with (or even requires)
determinism. Naturally this dialectical situation has given rise to “incompatibilism,” where what is at stake is compatibil-
ity/incompatibility with determinism. It is no surprise that arguments one way or the other generally turn out fruitless.
A good way of avoiding this particular knot is to shift focus to the question of the compatibility between agency and
indeterminism, or even more interestingly, to plunge ahead under the belief that agency presupposes indeterminism in the
causal order.
This stance, which lines up with that of Kane [14], is taken by Belnap et al. [9] (Facing the future, henceforth FF), which
concentrates on agents in so-called “branching time” (BT). FF discusses at length how agency ﬁts into and is illuminated
by BT, arguing that the rudiments of indeterminism as required by agency are well-modeled by BT. Branching time is not,
however, a comfortable background for stating the doctrine that an agentive choice is a locatable event that inﬂuences only
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time, which has no concept of distance, nor even the much more modest concept of “over there.” That doctrine can only be
stated and understood in the context of a causal order that, unlike branching time, supports the idea of “over there,” which
the jargon of Special Relativity calls “space-like relatedness.” A causal order admitting both indeterminism and space-like
relatedness is well-modeled, up to an approximation, in “branching space–times,” henceforth BST, as deﬁned in Belnap [1].1
In the normal case, space-like relatedness of choice events guarantees that the choices are independent (not correlated).
The abnormal, even weird, case of space-like related choices that are nevertheless correlated is called “funny business”; it
is investigated in Belnap [3,5], and Müller et al. [22]. How causes, in the guise of causae causantes, or “originating causes,”
ﬁt into BST, provided there is no funny business, is developed in Belnap [7]. We may take over a good deal of that theory
if we identify free choices as among the originating causes in BST. From now on, I’ll drop “free” as redundant, in the belief
that so-called “Frankfurt cases” equivocate: Given that we suppress vagueness as a red herring, something called a choice is
either free, or it’s not really a choice. The identiﬁcation of choice and free choice ensures the principled propriety of claiming
that certain choices are entirely independent. To this end, we’ll outline the beginnings of a theory of “branching space–times
with agents and choices” (BSTAC), using previous work as much as possible. We aim for a mathematically rigorous theory;
as a consequence, the theory necessarily avoids the typical waﬄing about agency with mental concepts, and as such does
not pretend to offer a “complete” story.
2. Rudiments of the theory of branching space–times
One way of understanding the aim of BST is by thinking of it as arising by two independent moves from Newtonian
theory, a theory that is both deterministic and non-relativistic. Move 1: “Branching time” theory comes from the Newto-
nian basis by replacing determinism with indeterminism, while still being non-relativistic. The “world” of branching time is
composed of “moments” in a tree-like arrangement, with each complete branch counting as a possible “history.” It is critical
that each moment should be pictured as a “simultaneity slice” extending straight across the entire universe, “edge to edge,”
so to speak. The picture of a history as a linear order of spatially wide instantaneous events violates the relativistic principle
that there is no absolute meaning to simultaneity. Furthermore, in branching time, a branch point between two histories
is the entire “simultaneity slice,” so that this “all at once” branching, involving, for example, simultaneous branching in
Chicago and at a chosen spot on the surface of Neptune, looks to be a serious violation of the relativistic prohibition of
“action at a distance.” Move 2: The core idea of Special Relativity comes from the Newtonian basis by retaining determin-
ism, while replacing global inﬂuences (action at a distance) with relativistic only-local inﬂuences. The “world” of Special
Relativity is composed of “point events” in a four-dimensional “space–time” based on a causal ordering. The causal future
of a point event is restricted to the forward light cone determined by the causal order, and, symmetrically, the causal past
is conﬁned to the backward light cone. Finally, the theory of branching space–times is intended to be both indeterministic
and relativistic: Many possible histories branching each from each, with each history being a relativistic space–time. Both
the indeterminism and the relativity ingredient in the theory of branching space–times are intended as “pre-physics”; for
example, no probabilities and no frames of reference—indeed, no numbers. The aim here is to highlight deep features of
these theories by suppressing the serious physics and the numbers that they require. In order to avoid both the forbidden
notion of absolute simultaneity and also “action at a distance,” the branching between two space–times must occur at a
point event. It seems clear that a good theory of branching space–times does not at once come to mind.
The primitives of BST are two: (1) Our World, abbreviated OW , is intended to be a set of “concrete possible point events”
(or just “point events”) e ∈ OW , and (2) <, the “causal order” on OW . The causal-ordering relation e1 < e2, which has both
spatio-temporal and modal signiﬁcance in BST, may be read as either “e1 is in the settled causal past of e2” or “e2 is in
the future of possibilities of e1.” It is assumed that < is a strict partial order on OW with no maximal elements. Where a
chain is a subset of OW such that two distinct members are always comparable by <, an outcome chain, O , is a nonempty
lower bounded chain, and it is assumed that every outcome chain has an inﬁmum. A history, h, is a maximal directed set,
where a set is directed if it contains an upper bound for each pair of its members. An initial chain, I , is nonempty and upper
bounded, and it is assumed that every initial chain has a supremum in every history that contains it. Fact: Under the causal
ordering, histories are closed toward the past (if two histories overlap at a point event, they share the whole causal past
of that point event). H is a set of histories (also called a proposition). There is also a postulate saying that given two initial
chains and two histories, the order of the respective suprema is preserved as the histories are varied. But far and away the
most distinctive assumption is the “prior choice postulate,” which says that every contingent outcome has an originating
cause in its past:
Prior choice postulate. Let O be an outcome chain, and let O ⊆ (h1 − h2). Then there is a point event e in the causal past of every
member of O such that e is maximal in (h1 ∩ h2).
These postulates taken together yield “BST,” the theory of branching-space times according to Belnap [1].
1 There are in the literature several candidates for BST theory and several developments thereof. Consult in particular the works of Kowalski and Müller
and Placek and Weiner; see especially [15,19,23,25,27,29]. Of special note are their contributions to the theory of probabilities in BST, to the theory of
counterfactual conditionals in BST, and to the application to certain problems in quantum mechanics.
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in Belnap [6] (henceforth CC). I have to go through some technicalities to get there, so that it will be good to keep in mind
the relevant concept of causation at which we are aiming. It comes from the work of Mackie [18]. There Mackie develops
an idea which has become well known: the idea of a cause as an “INUS condition,” using an acronym for “insuﬃcient but
non-redundant part of an unnecessary but suﬃcient” condition (think constituent of a disjunctive normal form). An important
difference is that here, in contrast to Mackie, I develop a rigorous theory of causes and effects as certain kinds of events
(rather than propositions) in BST. Here is a bare-bones sketch:
1. H〈O 〉 is the set of all histories overlapping O ; it represents as a “proposition” O ’s beginning to be, which is the way
that outcome chains “occur” in a history.
2. H(e) , the set of all histories to which e belongs, is the proposition that e occurs. h1 ≡e h2 is read “h1 is undivided at e
from h2,” and is provably an equivalence relation on H(e) . The induced partition of H(e) is written Πe , with Πe〈h〉, for
e ∈ h, being the member of Πe to which h belongs. The idea of Πe is essential to BST theory. When a set of histories,
H , belongs to Πe , it is proper to understand H as an elementary possibility at or immediate outcome of e. Of course one
case, the uninteresting case, is that H = H(e) , making the partition trivial. In the nontrivial case, if H1, H2 are distinct
members of Πe , they must be disjoint, which is to say, inconsistent. e is then said to be a choice point; in this case, if
history h1 ∈ H1 and history h2 ∈ H2, we write h1 ⊥e h2 to say that the two histories “split” at e: Before and at e, both
histories are possible (e belongs to both histories), but at any point event after e, at most one is possible (no point after
e belongs to both histories). Splitting at choice points is how OurWorld counts as being a world of “branching histories.”
3. “Transition events” are of central importance in the BST theory of causation. Deﬁning a scattered outcome event as a
set, O, of outcome chains all of which overlap some one history, and deﬁning an initial event, I, as a nonempty subset
of some one history, a transition event is deﬁned as an ordered pair, written I O, such that I precedes O in the
causal order in an appropriate sense: Every point event in I properly precedes some chain in O. The entire theory
can be generalized by taking outcomes of transitions as “disjunctive outcome events,” represented by a set of pairwise
inconsistent scattered outcome events; and it can be specialized by restricting attention to “chain” outcome events.
4. Even more specialized are the crucial basic transitions that are at the bottom of BST causal theory. They can be rep-
resented as point-event/outcome-chain transitions (e O ), where inf (O ) = e, or as point-event/outcome-proposition
transitions (eΠe〈h〉), where e ∈ h. The two representations turn out to come to the same thing. In either case, a basic
transition is from a point event to an immediate outcome of e. Such transitions are the ultimate, uncaused originating
causes, the causae causantes.
5. But causes of what? The simplest to explain is causation of an outcome chain, O . When a contingent outcome, O ,
occurs, we should always look for an event in Our World where things could have gone either way, either ruling out
O altogether, or keeping it possible. In BST terms, that means looking for a point event, e, at which there is a split
between some history excluding O entirely and the histories H〈O 〉 in which O begins to be: h ⊥e H〈O 〉 for some h. The
prior choice postulate guarantees that we shall ﬁnd at least one such in the past of contingent O .
6. Such an e is a basic cause-like locus for O . It turns out, however, that the theory of basic cause-like loci is not easily
understood in the absence of an additional postulate, the so-called “no funny business” postulate, which we therefore
assume. The postulate simply says that all cause-like loci for O lie in the past of O . I therefore let pcl(O ) be the set of
past cause-like loci of O . We might call the resultant theory simply BST+NFB; for the duration of this essay, however,
we use plain “BST” as short for “BST+NFB.”
7. But which of the many basic outcomes of a past causal locus of e should be considered in deﬁning the idea of a causa
causans of O? If there were funny business, that question might be diﬃcult, but as it is, since e is in the past of O , we
can calculate that the occurrence of O is consistent with (i.e., has a history in common with) exactly one basic outcome
of e. Let us give it a name: Provided e < O , deﬁne Πe〈O 〉, read “the projection of O onto e,” as the unique member of
Πe that is consistent with H〈O 〉.
8. Finally, deﬁne cc(O ), read the set of causae causantes of O , as {(e Πe〈O 〉): e ∈ pcl(O )}; that is, as the set each
member of which is a nontrivial basic transition with initial e whose outcome is precisely the projection of O onto e.
9. This story generalizes, the most general concept being the set cc(I O ) of causae causantes of a transition event with
initial, I, and disjunctive outcome, O . Details, necessarily omitted here, are all to be found in CC. The critical upshot
is that the full set of causae causantes of an outcome event or a transition event is provably always a full set of INUS
conditions of the event in the sense of Mackie [18], where, to repeat, an INUS condition is an insuﬃcient but non-
redundant part of an unnecessary but suﬃcient condition. The causae causantes as a whole give the complete objective
causal story in terms of events that describe the “why” (or perhaps the “how”) of the outcome or transition event.
10. The concept of a scattered outcome event, O, is intermediate between that of a chain outcome, O , and a disjunctive
outcome, O . The scattering can be either space-like or time-like. Being non-disjunctive, a scattered outcome event, O, or
transition event I O, like a chain outcome, O , will have a set of causae causantes that are to be taken non-disjunctively,
not as a set of INUS conditions, but instead as a set of “INNS” conditions, each of which is an insuﬃcient but non-
redundant part of a necessary and suﬃcient condition. Some of the most inﬂuential literature on causation either confuses
INUS and INNS conditions, or, more likely, gives an only informal and partly subjective account of the difference.
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theory of causation in the events.
3. Agents
FF took the basic locution of the theory of agents and their choices to be [α stit: Q ], read “α sees to it that Q .” There
was no separate theory of agents independent of this locution. As a consequence, in FF, based as it was on branching time,
and with explicit refusal to import any “mental” concepts, there could be no direct analysis of “the real internal constitution”
of an agent. Instead, a nonempty set called Agent was postulated, members of which were characterized only indirectly, by
reference to, so to speak, what they objectively did or might have done, or might do.
3.1. The representation of the agent
Here I outline a theory, “BSTAC,” of how agents and choices ﬁt into branching space–times. Even though the name doesn’t
so suggest, BSTAC is intended to be limited by the inclusion of a “no funny business” postulate. Because BST takes OW to
be based on point events instead of moments (which, recall, are instantaneous in time, but maximally spread out in space),
something more can be said about the inner structure of an agent.
The simple idea is to adapt the theory of agents to the chief difference between non-relativistic branching time and rel-
ativistic branching space–times, namely, the difference between what “the causal order relation” relates. The critical feature
of agents in branching time is that moments are super-events taken to be “spatially” rich enough to be “occupied” by more
than one agent. That in turn calls for a BT-stit postulate insuring that the simultaneous choices of distinct agents must
necessarily be independent. There can be no “inﬂuence” of the choice of one agent at four o’clock sharp on the choice of
another agent at exactly that same time. To suppose the contrary is to suppose a form of “action at a distance,” and to
become involved in pointless muddles, perhaps involving some confused idea of “common cause” that is not relevant to
(free) choice.2
Branching space–times theory, however, postulates point events instead of moments. Point events would seem to be so
small as to admit the “presence” of at most one agent. Perhaps for modeling some weird scenarios one might wish to play
with “double occupancy,” but it is a byway that at this point is best left unexplored.3 For this reason it seems reasonable to
begin by representing an agent as a set of point events, the set of point events that may be thought of as possibly occurring
in the course of his or her life. (For reasons given at the end of the discussion below of the “External standpoint,” it is better
to think this way instead of copying branching-time theory by thinking of the point events as “locations” of the agent.) In
contrast, in branching time it would make no sense at all to represent an agent as a set of moments! Continuing to use
Agent as the set of agents, we may therefore begin with a simple assumption.
Postulate 1 (Representation of the agent). Every agent, α ∈ Agent, is a nonempty set of point events in OW: ∀α[α ∈ Agent → ∅ =
α ⊆ Our World].
I hope that it is clear that I intend Postulate 1 as a representation of agents, not as an account of what agents “really
are.”
3.2. Standpoints
To make further sense, it is essential to assume a “standpoint.”
3.2.1. External standpoint
We may take ourselves for present purposes to be taking a “godlike” or “scientiﬁc” or “external” standpoint entirely
outside of Our World. In this case all point events are on a par: All are mere possibilities, and we are not entitled to use
either tense expressions or differentially applicable modal expressions. From the external standpoint, each member, e, of α
represents one of α’s possible (point-like) life events. For mere brevity, I usually drop “point like.” Perhaps this is an expository
mistake, given that I certainly wish to leave theoretical room for extended life events. The shorter phrase should, however,
work for this essay. We may say if we like that all point events (hence all of α’s possible life events) “are equally real,” as is
sometimes said with reference to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics; but it must be borne in mind that their
“reality” is the reality of mere possibilities. From the envisioned standpoint, it makes no sense to distinguish two kinds of
point events, the “possible” and the “actual,” much less three kinds, including the “impossible.”
2 The postulate works to keep the BT-stit theory out of trouble, but it is after all just wrong to think that choices of agents operating jointly should occur
at exactly the same moment. A reason to move from BT to BST was precisely to avoid “trouble” without the wrongness. Section 4.1 calls the BT postulate
“ludicrous.” It must be observed, however, that BT itself seems to have the resources causally to combine successive choices by one or more agents by
applying to BT the ideas of causae causantes as transitions—a thought that is not new, but since not having been worked out in detail, has heretofor been
expressed only in conversations.
3 Later we enter Postulate 5, which asserts that “double occupancy” doesn’t happen.
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events. To say that a point event, e1, is (1) possible or (2) actual or (3) impossible relative to e0, is simply to say that (1)
some history contains both e0 and e1, or (2) that every history containing e0 also contains e1 (that is, that at e0 it is settled
that e1 occurs), or (3) that no history contains both e0 and e1.
In a useful analogy, if (1) we take up a standpoint that is not itself located on the surface of planet Earth, then (1a) to
say, relationally, that “a is to the north of b” is sensible, but (1b) it makes no (ordinary) sense to use “is to the north” as a
one-place predicate. If, however, (2) we ourselves are located on the surface of planet Earth, then the context of utterance
supplies an otherwise missing second argument to the use of the one-place predicate, “is to the north.” As a corollary, if (1)
we take up a standpoint external to Our World, then (1a) relational “earlier/later,” and “space-like related” between pairs of
possible life events still make sense, but (1b) one-place “past/present/future/over-there” make no sense. Only when (2) we
take up a standpoint in Our World do the latter phrases make sense, provided they are understood as context-dependent.
(Shades of McTaggart!)
From such a “godlike” or “scientiﬁc” standpoint, when e ∈ α, we may say, in a strictly technical voice, that the point
event e is part of the agent α. One might also say that α is located at or occupies e, but it is much better to say that e
is one of α’s possible life events. The reason is that “location” suggests a position concept, but whereas a point event, e,
may have a position in OW , it is not a good idea to say that e is a position. After all, a central idea is that two radically
incompatible point events, each in a distinct possible future of some chance event, may occupy the same spatio-temporal
position. Further, invoking the ordering relation, we may say that when e0 < e1, either that e0 is in the causal past of e1, or
that e1 is in the (causal) future of possibilities of e0, since these phrases are tenseless and modally constant.
3.2.2. Internal standpoint
We may instead take ourselves to be located at some point event (paradigmatically the one to which “here-now” refers)
in Our World. This is most easily viewed through the lens of language, and so, idealizing, you should envisage the point
event as the point-event of utterance, or the context-of-utterance point event.4 In this case, the fundamental “truth” locution
should be
S, I, ec, e,h | A, read as
• A is true with respect to structure S, interpretation I, point event of utterance ec , point event e, and history h.
Here S lists the structure parameters, especially a domain of quantiﬁcation and the structural elements OW and <, but room
is left for space–time structural elements such as a “frame of reference.” S may itself be called the structure parameter. I is
the interpretation parameter whose job is to interpret the atomic pieces of the language, ec is the point event of utterance, e
is the point event of evaluation (an auxiliary parameter moved by tenses), h is the history of evaluation (moved by the “settled
true” construction), and A is the sentence to which parameter-dependent truth is attached. I skip the details, except to
emphasize that the causal future tense requires that, at a minimum, truth be relativized to a point event, e, and a history, h,
that contains e. How this should go can partly be inferred from Chapter 8 of FF, mutatis mutandis. See also the use of “double
time references” in Section 6 below; and for a general account of parameterized truth, see Belnap [8].
3.3. Agents and world lines
Given that we represent an agent, α, as a set of point events to be thought of as α’s possible life events, what constraints
make sense? In the beginning it seems best, since easiest, to think of the life of an agent in a particular history as a portion
of a “world line.” In other words, for each history, h, if we take the set of those of α’s possible life events that occur
in h, they form a linear order, stretching from α’s birth to α’s death in h, each causally comparable with each. (Whether
it counts as a fault or not, I confess little or no interest in imaginative speculations concerning a “personal split” within a
single, consistent course of events; within, that is, a single space–time.)
Postulate 2 (Agents and world lines). The portion of the life of an agent in a particular history is a chain of point events: ∀α∀h
[(α ∈ Agent & h ∈ Hist) → (α ∩ h) is a chain in Our World]. If (α ∩ h) =∅, we may say that α “doesn’t exist” in h. For each agent, α,
and history, h, we call the set (α ∩ h), provided it is nonempty, the life history of α in h, and therefore a possible life history of α.
Postulate 2 is at this stage of sophistication a natural and helpful postulate, but it is as well to recognize that in a longer
run it is likely to be a drastic simpliﬁcation of the notion of life history. I hope it is needless to say that I am claiming for
this postulate only that its simplicity makes it a good beginning; it may well turn out to be useful to represent an agent in a
single history as a cloud of point events rather than as a chain. Our chain representation rules out, for instance, that distinct
bodily point events count as distinct parts of a life history, since many such points are space-like related and accordingly
4 The phraseology is barbarous, but I have not been able to think of a safe improvement. Mere “point,” for instance, would wrongly suggest a position
in space–time, a position subject to being occupied by any one of a variety of pair-wise inconsistent concrete possible point events. I do in fact reserve
“point” for this positional use.
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manageable ﬁrst approximation.
It follows at once that α is a tree. That is, α is partially ordered by < (since α is a subset of OW), and α satisﬁes no
backward branching (that is, it’s false that for some e0, e1, e2 ∈ α, e0, e1 < e2, but neither e0  e1 nor e1  e0). For suppose
e0, e1, e2 ∈ α, and e0 < e2 and e1 < e2. e2 must belong to some history, say h, and therefore e0, e1 ∈ h by downward closure
of histories. Hence e0, e1 ∈ (α ∩ h), and since (α ∩ h) is a chain, either e0  e1 or e1  e0.
Next, following out an intuition that goes back at least to [16], we assume that each agent has a unique birth event, and
in each history a unique death event.
Postulate 3 (Birth and death of agents). If α is an agent, there is a historically (or modally) unique point event that is least among all
members of α. This we call the birth of α. Furthermore, for each history, h, such that α∩h = ∅, the life history of α in h has a maximum
(a unique greatest member). This we call the death of α in h.
On this construction, the death of α in h is a “life event” of α; not only does that seem technically harmless, but
informally both birth and death are often listed as events in the life of an agent.
The asymmetry in the representation of birth and death does not come from casual English, which, given an event,
e, in the actual life of, say, Alexander Hamilton, is equally happy with alternative possible futures vs. alternative possible
pasts of e. The former sensibly underwrites alternative possible death events, d1 and d2, of Alexander Hamilton, but BSTAC
properly forbids the latter, which would underwrite (distinct) alternative possible birth events, b1 and b2. (Evidently the
least member of a tree must, if it exists, be unique.)
Is it a strength or a weakness of BSTAC that it makes impossible that Hamilton was born earlier or later than he in fact
was? There is no doubt that in BSTAC, if we take “Alexander Hamilton” to name a particular agent, then Hamilton’s birth
event is modally ﬁxed. On the other hand, nothing so far laid down prohibits the development of a disjunctive concept of
an agent with different birth-events for each component. How that would go I do not know. I suspect that opening up the
theory in this way would lead to loose talk; but that is only a suspicion.
I also assume that the life history of each agent in each history is continuous:
Postulate 4 (Continuity of life histories).
(1) The causal ordering relation is dense in each life history of each agent: For e0, e2 ∈ (α ∩ h), if e0 < e2 , then there is a point event
e1 in (α ∩ h) such that e0 < e1 and e1 < e2 .
(2) For each agent, α, and history, h, if E is a subset of the life history of α in h, then the inﬁmum of E belongs to that life history, and
so does the supremum of E relative to h. (No jumps or gaps.)
This is perhaps more “metaphysics” than we need, but it makes our representation of agents easier on the imagination.
It is easy to become confused when speaking of persons (agents) against a background of indeterminism such as is coded
into branching space–times. It helps to remain aware that an agent is represented at three levels.
3.3.1. Summary of three levels
1. A possible life event. We may say that e is one of α’s possible life events iff e ∈ α (where e is a point event in OW and α
is an agent in Agent).
2. A possible life history. We may say that a subset E of OW is the possible life history of α in h iff E = α ∩ h. By natural
quantiﬁcations, one may speak of “α’s possible life histories in Our World,” and “the possible life histories of agents
in h.”
3. An agent (or a person). α is an agent iff α ∈ Agent, and hence α ⊆ OW . On this representation, each alternate life history
is a literal part of the agent. In slightly looser language, we might say that alternate possibilities are ingredient in the
very nature of the agent. This is to be understood in a sense consistent with the doctrine that some causae causantes of
a life event of agent α may be extrinsic to α, as we see in Section 3.4 below.
All of this is from the external point of view. From that standpoint, “possible” draws no distinction. For that reason, we can,
if we like, omit “possible” from “possible life event” and “possible life history” without doing much harm.
It is evident that the critical difference between (1) a life history of an agent and (2) an agent is this: Only an agent
contains not just choice points, but also the multiple jointly inconsistent but individually possible outcomes of choices
sharing a given choice point as initial. Put from a certain internal standpoint, thus is enabled “She chose to walk over the
bridge, but if instead she had chosen to run, she would have arrived in time.” No single life history can ground such a story.
When we are anchored to some particular context of utterance, ec , we may speak of “the actual past life history of
α” and “the future (portion of the) possible life histories of α,” etc. “Actual” and “past” and “future,” when not explicitly
relational, require anchoring to a context of utterance, and you may not use them if your standpoint is external—unless you are
prepared to meet the “no thin red line” arguments of Chapter 6 of FF.
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Next I explore branching of the life histories of an agent, α.
I’ve idealized a possible life of an agent as a kind of spatio-temporal “worm” in a history. This representation is familiar
since each individual history is supposed to be a space–time, and for a very long time philosophers—and often scientists—
have played with the worm picture. We then saw that the representation of each possible life history as a chain or worm
implies that the agent as a whole has the shape of a tree (no downward branching). It is tempting to leap to the conclusion
that each branching of the life histories of an agent, α, represents a decision point for α, but that would be wrong. BST
theory is more subtle than that. What is true according to the theory is the “prior choice postulate,” according to which if
some life event, e1, for an agent, α, occurs in one history, say h1, but not in another history, say h2, then there is in the past
of e1 a (possibly metaphorical) “choice point,” e0, which is a branch point in the sense of being maximal in the intersection
h1 ∩ h2 of the two histories. There is no warrant, however, for believing that e0 is one of α’s life events, or indeed is a life
event of any agent whatsoever. The indeterminism might be resident instead in some thoroughly non-agentive event such
as a fair toss of a coin or, perhaps, a choice point between spin-up and spin-down for some electron.
It remains true that a representation of an agent, α, must look a lot like a tree, but α’s tree will in general have two
quite different kinds of branching. Which kind will depend on whether the indeterminism represented by the branching is
a choice in the life of α, or whether instead the locus of the indeterminism is foreign to α. In both kinds of branching,
there is a single past-pointing worm-like representation of the past life of α up to the branching, and an entire assemblage
of distinct worm-like representations of the possible future-lives of α subsequent to the branching, severally distributed
among the histories in which the life of α continues.
More speciﬁcally, let α exist in both of two histories, h1 and h2, but with different deaths. In other words, let (α∩h1) =∅
and (α∩h2) =∅ and (α∩h1) = (α∩h2). Since histories are closed backward, the intersection (α∩h1 ∩h2)—call it E0—must
be a nonempty backward-pointing tail running from immediately below the branching clear back to the birth of α. Let E1
be the chain (α ∩ h1 − h2), and let E2 be the chain (α ∩ h2 − h1). L1 = (E0 ∪ E1) and L2 = (E0 ∪ E2), being respectively
(α ∩ h1) and (α ∩ h2), must each be a chain running from birth to death. By continuity and Dedekind, either (1) E0 has a
maximum, e0, or (2) each of E1 and E2 has a minimum, respectively e1 and e2. In case (1), one can show that not only
is e0 a choice point for the chains L1 and L2, but e0 can also be shown to be a choice point for h1 and h2, that is, a
point event maximal in h1 ∩ h2. In this case, since e0 ∈ α, we are entitled to attribute the split between h1 and h2 to the
agency of α, at least in part (there may be other maxima in (h1 ∩ h2)). In case (2), however, the minimum e1 of E1, which
is in h1 − h2, must be a supremum of E0 ∩ h1, and symmetrically the minimum e2 of E2, which is in h2 − h1, must be a
supremum of E0 ∩ h2. So E0 must have two (distinct) history-dependent suprema, one in h1 only, and the other in h2 only.
These two suprema, being as close as they are to E0, that is, each with nothing in between, must themselves be vanishingly
close to each other. Although OW is topologically a T1 space, e1 and e2 testify that OW is not a T2 space; that is, OW is
non-Hausdorff and thus explicitly not a manifold. If one had a doctrine of “space–time positions,” e1 and e2 would have to
occupy the same space–time position, differing only modally by being in different histories.5
This representation of agency in branching space–times presupposes continuity of each space–time. How best to repre-
sent agents-in-branching-space–times discretely, as is perhaps required for computer applications, is open for research.6 But
just as computer representations of real arithmetic must in some way answer to “real” arithmetic of the reals, so any such
discrete representation must in the end answer to Our World as a BSTAC.
4. Choices
At this point we have a theory of pcls and causae causantes from Section 2 and a theory of agents from Section 3. (Recall
that a “pcl” or “past causal locus” of O , is a point event in the past of O at which one possible immediate future of e is
consistent with the proposition that O occurs, whereas the rest of the possible immediate futures of e are inconsistent with
the occurrence of O .) These analyses leave us little option for an analysis of a choice point for an agent, α, relevant for an
outcome, O ; namely,
Deﬁnition 1 (Choice point, favoring).
(1) e is a choice point for agent α relevant for outcome O iff e is a life event of agent α that is a past causal locus of O ; that
is, e ∈ (α ∩ pcl(O )).
(2) Provided e is a choice point for α relevant for O , (eΠ〈O 〉) is a choice by α that favors O .
(3) A life history of α is relevant for O if some life event of that life history is a past causal locus of O .
5 Please do not infer that OW is a weird space–time. It is not, of course, a space–time at all, neither branching nor non-branching; it is, in intent,
an assemblage of space–times that branch one from another, the branching being modal rather than spatio-temporal. Earman [12] endorses “ensemble”
branching in contrast to “individual” branching. Since Earman, however, loads his phrase with a special meaning, it seems best to avoid “ensemble” in favor
of “assemblage.”
6 I say “perhaps” because the continuity of each space–time by no means demands that every model admit an inﬁnity of agents or of causae causantes,
much less a continuum of such.
90 N. Belnap / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 83–94All this is spoken from an external standpoint. Observe that the choice is a transition event, that is, an ordered pair
satisfying certain conditions. Why a transition event? Well, an initial event does not do justice to the idea of choice, because
no outcome of the choosing is speciﬁed. If you are on the verge of deciding to turn left, you are also (say) on the verge of
deciding to turn right, so being “on the verge” cannot count as the choice. So also an outcome event, you having decided
to turn left, although a better candidate (since its inﬁmum must be the initial of the choice), does not on the face of
it represent the particular, concrete indecision between (say) turning left and turning right that is certainly part of the
choice. Reiﬁcation of a choice ought to represent both the undecided initial and the result of the decision; that’s why it is
represented as an ordered pair of initial and outcome. In other words, at any time up to and including (say) t , there is more
than one possibility for the future, and at any time after t the choice has already been made; so when was the choice?
You need both a “before-and-up-to t” with no-choice-yet, and an “after t” with choice-has-been made; that is, you need a
transition. A lot less ink would be spilled on the concept of choice if this were recognized as a truism.
In Deﬁnition 1(2), the idea of “favoring” is a notion of “partial causation.” A transition “favors” an outcome if it keeps the
outcome possible at least for a while; that is, although there is no thought that the transition guarantees the occurrence of
the outcome, O , it does not render it henceforth impossible—as does every other immediate outcome of e.
4.1. Stit
The workhorse locution “[α stit: Q ]” in FF, where α names an agent and Q is a sentence, signiﬁes that the choice
of the agent, α, guarantees the truth of Q (Positive condition) in circumstances in which Q is not already settled true
(Negative condition). If we are speaking of a single choice, it needs observing that it must be seldom indeed that a single
basic transition, (eΠe〈h〉), can guarantee the truth of Q , unless Q reports, in effect, an immediate outcome of e, a case
that I ﬁrst consider.
I rely on the fundamental truth locution, S, I, ec, e,h | A, pertinent to the “internal standpoint” of Section 3.2. The only
difference from FF is the move from the moments of branching time to the point events of BST. The account of stit is
structurally the same.
S, I, ec, e,h1 | [α stit: Q ] iff e ∈ α and S, I, ec, e,h2 | Q for all h2 such that h1 ≡e h2 in the sense of Section 2(2)
(Positive condition), and S, I, ec, e,h2  Q for some h2 such that e ∈ h2 (Negative condition).
This is the dstit of FF and [13], which looks better in branching time than in branching space–times, since in the former
case, originating causes must be linearly ordered. When, however, we consider many causae causantes based on many past
causal loci in Our World, it is forced upon us that the various pcls are likely to be spread out, some pairs having a space-like
relation, and other pairs a causal relation. It’s not easy to see the point of collapsing this wealth of structure into the stit
framework, which was predicated on a single moment as initial, even when considering multiple agents. (For a seeing-to-it
by a group Γ of agents, FF imposed the artiﬁcial and even ludicrous requirement that the choices of the agents in Γ be
simultaneous so that the causal independence of the various choices could be guaranteed.)
What we can do in a straightforward manner in BSTAC theory is to catch the notion that an outcome O is entirely due
to choices of an agent, α. That gives us a thought connection with stit. The practice has been to differentiate stit concepts
by means of a preﬁxed letter, as in astit, dstit, and so on. In analogy, I use “pstit” for a stit concept based on past causal loci,
so that [α pstit O ] might be read as “α sees to it that Q in virtue of a system of prior choices by α.”
Deﬁnition 2 (pstit in BSTAC). [α pstit O ] iff ∅ = pcl(O ) ⊆ α.
Since every causa causans of O must originate in a past causal locus of O , the deﬁnition says that every causa causans
of O is identical to a choice by α that favors O , so that the choices by α give a complete causal account of the occurrence
of O . The choices by α taken together give a suﬃcient condition for O , and each choice separately is (in general) insuﬃcient
but necessary and (most critically) is irredundant; so that we have an INNS condition.
It is necessary to observe that Deﬁnition 2 deﬁnes an “external” phrase, whereas the aim of FF was to characterize
a phrase that could serve as a context-dependent part of a language to be spoken by those taking up a standpoint in
an indeterministic world. The tasks are not equivalent; starting from Deﬁnition 2, to determine a happy path to such a
characterization is by no means automatic. Observe, for instance, that the present story about seeing-to-it-that in branching
space–times is more narrowly focused than the companion story of FF about stit in branching time: The Q in [α stit: Q ]
took the place of an arbitrary sentence, which could express an arbitrary proposition, but Deﬁnition 2, in contrast, explains
“seeing to it that in virtue of a system of prior choices” only for outcome events, and indeed only for outcome chains, the
easiest case of all, and so derivatively only for rather simple outcome propositions.
Still, the system of causae causantes is in certain dimensions much less limiting than that of FF, and that not only
because of the move from branching time to branching space–times. I can illustrate what I mean while staying entirely in
the branching-time framework. The scheme of FF is defective to the extent that there is no way to represent an outcome as
caused by a succession of contributory causes. There is no way to say that Mary saw to it that the dishes were washed by
carrying out a sequence of choices: First she chose to do the silverware at moment m1, then the plates at m2, and, ﬁnally,
the serving dishes at m3. The scheme of FF permits only the last to count, the others being redundant just by being causally
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choosing to wash the serving dishes implies having previously chosen to wash the plates. Instead, since histories are closed
downward, there is a bare geometric fact: That the ﬁnal choice point, m3, occurs in a history, h, implies as a “historically
necessary condition” not only that m2 (which was postulated as earlier that m3) also occurs in h, but furthermore that an
outcome chain, O , representing the outcome of the plates choice at m2, also occurs in h. That’s because there (provably) is
a unique immediate outcome of m2 that favors m3.
The present analysis overcomes this severe defect by not looking at mere outcomes (silverware washed, plates washed, and
serving dishes washed), but by instead looking at the basic transitions, (m1 silverware-washed), (m2 plates-washed), and
(m3 serving-dishes-washed). It is those transitions which, when properly understood, are each an irredundant necessary
condition of her washing the dishes.7 Those transitions, taken together, form a set of INNS conditions (INNS rather than
INUS because, in this example, not disjunctive).8
All is not, however, plain sailing. It remains natural to ask when Mary washed the dishes. If the question is asked
rhetorically as part of an effort to cast doubt on BSTAC theory, the defensive response is to remind the questioner that
we are dealing with transitions, and that we have all known from the beginning that transitions, to use an apt expression
coined by a famous Philosopher, have no “simple location.” To suppose otherwise is to commit Whitehead’s “fallacy of
simple location.” One might suggest that it is unlikely to be fruitful to inquire into, for example, “the time of a killing.” That
negative-minded suggestion may well have, however, a variety of interesting counters. I leave the matter in this open state.
5. Many agents
One agent is hardly enough to populate Our World: The theory must provide for many agents. This is a complicated
matter, needing additional research. Here I say just a few easy things.
Let us think of the joint representation of two or more agents. The thought comes to mind that two agents might share
a life event. I think, however, that no good will come of tracing out the consequences of this thought. It is just too weird,
too spooky. Not that it might not happen; it’s just that if it does happen, present thinking is not likely to help clarify the
matter. I therefore enter the following.
Postulate 5 (No agent overlap). Agents never overlap: ∀α1∀α2[(α1,α2 ∈ Agent & α1 = α2) → (α1 ∩ α2) =∅].
The postulate says, in effect, that the“world lines” of two agents cannot intersect. It is something like “no two material
objects in the same place at the same time,” and perhaps that observation is enough to raise the comfort level of the
postulate.
Agent is somewhat like an “absolute concept” in the sense of Bressan [10]: If you are given a life event, e, there is a
unique member of Agent of which e is a part. In other words, if (α1 ∩ α2) =∅ then α1 = α2.
It is easy to say, from the external standpoint, that a group of agents is entirely responsible for O :
Deﬁnition 3 (Group stit). Provided Γ ⊆ Agent, [Γ stit O ] iff ∅ = pcl(O ) ⊆⋃Γ .
Thus one can see that the apparatus of pcls and causae causantes makes it effortless to move from saying that the
occurrence of O is entirely the doing of a single agent, α, to saying that the set of agents, Γ , is fully responsible for the
occurrence of O .9 Even so, although it is easy to say, one would have to choose O carefully in order to have an example that
rang true. Idealization will have to play a role in applying any of these stit concepts. There are a variety of such examples
to be found in FF, and although worked out there in branching time, given enough leeway for idealization, there should be
no problem in transporting them to BSTAC. In contrast, the analogous favoring concepts should have wide application, the
point being that virtually all that we “do” requires the “cooperation” of other agents, and of nature as well. (Please put the
blame for this on Our World, not on me.)
5.1. Message sending and receiving
To put in relief one aspect of group responsibility, one would expect that there be communication among members of
the group. What can the theory of branching space–times say about communication, while still holding to its policy of
foregoing mental concepts, which are inevitably loose? What, that is, can we say about the causal underpinnings of sending
and receiving and acting upon messages?
7 To be ﬁt for service in INNS and INUS conditions, it unexpectedly turns out that a transition should be taken to “occur” just when if the initial occurs,
then so does the outcome—with the “if—then” understood as a material (truth-functional) implication!
8 FF aimed at something like this with the “transition stit” of Chapter 8G.5, but that section entirely missed the mark, and should be consigned to the
proverbial ﬂames.
9 Deﬁnition 3 would need to be amended if one wished to prohibit “free riders” and the like. Chapter 10 of FF should be consulted.
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that for several reasons: (1) There is the question of “noise,” construed as randomly generated. (2) Sending a message ought
to involve choice. I hope you agree that in the present context automated “message-sending” systems are beside the point.
(3) Choice is also involved in receiving a message. I have in mind what J. Thomson calls “uptake.” At the very least, the
receiver has to choose to prepare for the reception. (4) And if the message is to be “effective,” it should contribute causally
to the receiver’s taking some action. The theory of probabilities in branching space–times (as in Placek [24] and, especially,
Müller [20] and Weiner and Belnap [29]) would doubtless play an important role in the theory of message-passing. Stable,
detailed considerations on this topic remain to be developed.
6. Norms
This essay was initially conceived as being concerned with norms in branching space–times, and that remains the prin-
cipal aim of the research of which it is the product. There turned out to be, however, so much required in the way of
preliminary conceptual analysis that I have had to shrink what I have to say explicitly about norms to negligible propor-
tions. This accounts for my labeling this essay as a “prolegomenon.”
BSTACN (BSTAC with norms) postulates generated norms, that is, norms that are generated by a particular localized act
of an agent. Wansing [28] has studied such norms in the context of branching time, with the stit apparatus, emphasizing
the dual roles of the giver and receiver of obligations as agents, etc. Also FF has several chapters that consider norms in
branching time, and Müller [21] makes yet further advances. Here my remarks ﬁnd their basis in “double time references”
as described in FF (see the index of FF) and Belnap [2] (DTR). The norm-generating act might be the making of a promise,
the laying on of an obligation, the issuing of an invitation, etc. Say that the norm has been issued. Such an act need not be
a speech act, but it is technically convenient to suppose that each norm is issued as if by the use of a declarative core in
direct speech. For example, at a point-event, e0, on Monday, Jack promises Sarah with the following words. I promise you as
follows:
(∗∗) If it rains in Chicago on Tuesday, I will see to it that you receive $5 on Wednesday.
(∗∗) is called the declarative core of the promise-event occurring at e0. The promise has an interesting semantics that requires
indeterministic BSTACN as background. It seems essential that at the point event e0, (∗∗) is neither settled true nor settled
false. (Don’t say that (∗∗) is neither true nor false; if you do, you will have a hard time avoiding confusion.) To say that the
promise made at e0 on Monday has been carried out at a certain later point event, e1, on Tuesday means (roughly) that the
conditional (∗∗) is true with respect to every point-event-history pair e0/h, for every history h to which (not just e0 but
instead) e1 belongs, and relative to speaker= Jack, auditor= Sarah, and point-event of utterance= e0. In other words, at e1
it is settled true that (∗∗) was (plain) true (not settled true) at the point, e0, at which the promise was issued. This recipe
invokes what FF and DTR call a “double time reference,” and which MacFarlane [17] describes in terms of branching time
by saying that (∗∗) is “true” with respect to moment of utterance e0 and moment of assessment, e1. MacFarlane’s analysis
deserves endorsement; but I beg leave to doubt the wisdom of his terminology, which uses “true” for what is at bottom a
modal notion involving quantiﬁcation over histories.
A description of the norm involved requires more than just double time references. A satisfying—though hardly unique—
representation of the normative content of the promising should turn out to be an assignment of “strategies,” in the austere
sense of Chapters 13 and 14 of FF, to agents in a world of branching space–times. A strategy for α rooted in e0 will be a
function, s, with domain a subset of α and limited to life events at or (causally) after e0. For e1 in its domain, s(e1) will tell
α which immediate outcomes of e1 are permitted by the strategy, so that s(e1) ⊆ Πe1 .
The strategic content of the example might be characterized informally as follows. Let the promissor be α1 and the
promisee be α2, with respective strategies s1 and s2, and pick any possible α1-life-event, say e1, in the future of possibilities
of the promise-event, e0. If at e1 it is settled that (∗∗) was true at e0 (note: Settled-Was, not Was-Settled!), the norm has
been satisﬁed, and there is nothing more for α1 to do. This can be represented by s1(e2) = Πe2 (anything goes) for all
possible life events e2 for α1 that are subsequent to e1. If, however, it is settled at e1 that (∗∗) was false at e0, then the
norm has been violated, and appropriate sanctions are due. Perhaps s1(e2), for e1 < e2, limits choices by α1 at e2 in a
punishing sort of way (no more chocolate-chip cookies). Or perhaps the strategy s2 for α2 kicks in, permitting or even
requiring certain choices by α2 that favor sanctioning α1. There are of course many possibilities for cashing out a sanction
on α1.
Aside from the cases in which at e1 (∗∗) is either settled true or settled false, there remains the crucial case when at
e1 (∗∗) is simply not settled at all; that is, whether at e1 (∗∗) was true at e0 is open (historically contingent). Then the
strategy, s1, for the promissor at e1 requires α1 to do something, at the very least to make a choice among the options Πe1
that keeps the future satisfaction of the promise possible, and, furthermore, if some members of Πe1 guarantee satisfaction
of the promise, then to choose one of those. (Without belaboring the obvious, permit me to note that the requirement that
α1 do something is a strikingly objective explanation of the mere metaphor, “world-to-words ﬁt”—nor am I aware of any
other comparably objective account.) As indicated in DTR, other sorts of norms call for related descriptions in branching
space–times.
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Here, brieﬂy, is where we have been.
The underlying rationale for this essay given in Section 1 is that norms require agents and indeterminism, that generated
norms reference choice events that inﬂuence only the causal future, and that an account of norms should give due consider-
ation to space-like-related agent choices. A “branching space–times” (BST) structure that is indeterministic, relativistic, and
has room for agents seems to be required. Although not obvious in this largely informal essay, complete mathematical rigor
is imposed as a constraint on BST theory.
From previous work on BST, I emphasize in Section 2 the ontology of point events and a causal ordering that is a
common generalization of the orderings of special relativity and of “branching times.” BST theory is a story about “events.”
A “history” is deﬁned as, in effect, a maximal consistent set of (not propositions but) point events; histories carry the
modal burden of BST in strict analogy to “possible worlds” theory (but it’s only an analogy). Deﬁned kinds of events include
initial events, outcome events, transition events, and among the latter, basic “immediate” transitions, which can serve as
originating causes, or causae causantes. An initial of a causa causans of an outcome event is called a “past causal locus,”
and the set of causae causantes of an outcome event provably form a set of INUS conditions in Mackie’s sense: Each is an
insuﬃcient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but suﬃcient condition of the occurrence of the outcome.
An ontology of agents is forthcoming in Section 3, yielding the theory “BSTAC” (branching space–times with agents and
choices). An agent is represented in BSTAC as a kind of tree, each branch of which is a continuous chain of point events,
from birth to death, in some history. Given an agent, such a chain is called a “life history,” and is conceived as consisting in
point-like “life events.”
As indicated in Section 4, of principal interest with respect to some outcome are those of its past causal loci that are
part of the agent. A choice made by an agent might or might not “favor” a certain outcome. When all past causal loci of an
outcome lie within the agent, since the agent contains a complete set of INUS conditions for the outcome, we say that the
agent “sees to it that” [stit] the outcome occurs, thus making contact with earlier work on agents in branching time.
There is in Section 5 a brief discussion of multiple agents, including the observation that distinct agents never overlap in
BSTAC, and that generalizing “stit” to a group of agents is straightforward. This idea of a “group stit” is, however, weak. It
could be somewhat strengthened (without violating the “no loose mental talk” constraint on BSTAC theory) by the notion
of “message passing,” which can have an entirely objective account in BSTAC.
Section 6 hints at a theory of norms generated by choices of an agent, for example, the norm that is generated by the
making of a promise. The essay advances the thesis that understanding something like a promise requires the ability of
BSTAC to handle correctly the “double time reference” involved in saying that a promise made at an earlier point event has
(or hasn’t) been carried out at a later point event. Finally, the essay suggests that in describing a norm generated by, for
example, a promise, one wants to combine double time references with the austere theory of “strategies” of FF, Chapters 13
and 14.
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